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NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellants (Plaintiffs) seek to recover their rights 
in real property and declare null and void, for lack of considera-
tion and duress, an agreement between them and Respondents (De-
fendants) by which Respondents claim an interest in the property. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The District court in and for Salt Lake County, Judge 
Ernest F. Baldwin sitting without a jury, rendered judgment for 
Respondents (Defendants) and awarded them the disputed real property 
interests, subject to certain encumbrances. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAR 
Appellants seek reversal of the lower court's judgment 
together with certain findings and conclusions on which the judgment 
is based, with the resulting effect that Respondents shall have 
no interest in the subject real property. tn the alternative, 
Appellants seek a remand and a new trial betore a jury, a right 
erroneously denied by the lower court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
For ease of reference, citations to the trial transcript 
will refer to the transcript page numbers as "Tr. ". Other parts 
of the record will be cited "R. ". 
Prior to 1973, Appellants (Plaintiffs) JOSEPH S. GASSER 
and FREDA N. GASSER, his wife, (for conveniqnce sometimes referred 
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to collectively herein as the "GASSERS") owned 42.5% of a mobile 
home park in Layton, Davis County, Utah, known as "Hillgate Terrace". 
The remaining interests were owned by a Smith Family (15%) and a 
Dr. Skankey (42.5%). The interest was subject to a mortgage in 
the amount of $139,000.00 to Dr. Skankey as security for other obliga-
tions, and an additional mortgage of $225,000.00 to a group headed 
by Dr. Skankey (referred to in the record as the "Skankey group") 
as security for further indebtedness of the GASSERS. The $225,000.00 
was secured as well by a mortgage on an apartment house owned by 
the GASSERS in Missoula, Montana along with other securities. (See 
Tr. 29/104 and 122 and Ex. 18-D). The Hillgate Terrace was subject 
also to a first mortgage to another financial institution, not 
in issue here. (Tr. 106). 
In order to obtain funds with which to pay the Skankey 
group and Dr. Skankey, to purchase the interests of Smith and Skankey 
in Hillgate Terrace, and to make improvements thereon, Mr. GASSER 
began negotiating in early 1973 for a loan of at least $1 million 
against Hillgate Terrace. His preliminary investigations indicated 
that the money supply was tight and the loan may have to carry an 
additional guarantor. Mr. GASSER approached Defendant DAVID M. 
HORNE who indicated a willingness to guaranty or co-sign the loan. 
GASSER and HORNE made a joint application to Prudential Federal 
Savings (Ex. 14-D) which was rejcted, and thereafter made application 
to American Savings & Loan Association for a loan, concerning 
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which the additional relevant events occurred. Subsequently, 
HORNE demanded 50% interest in Hillgate Terrace as a condition of 
co-signing on the note and mortgage. A draft agreement was prepared 
by Joseph L. Henriod, Esq. in early April 1973 (Ex. 4-P) incorporat-
ing the terms agreed to by HORNE and GASSER. In substance, if 
GASSER could complete the loan in 60 days without the necessity 
of HORNE's signature, HORNE would have no interest in the property; 
otherwise, HORNE would co-sign the note and mortgage and receive 
a 50% interest. 
During the time HORNE and GASSER were negotiating with 
American Savings & Loan, and GASSER was seeking means of concluding 
a loan without HORNE's signature, a foreclosure action was underway 
in Montana by which Mr. Henriod, or Montana counsel at his direction, 
sought to collect funds due Dr. Skankey or the Skankey Group. (Tr. 
287). Mr. Henriod represented the Skankey group. Both previously 
and subsequently, he represented DAVID M. HORNE on other matters. 
(Tr. 319). Although he claimed not to represent HORNE in the negoti-
ations with GASSER here in dispute, he drafted and revised the 
agreements in question and discussed all matters pertaining to 
HORNE's interests either with GASSER directly or with GASSER's counsel, 
James L. Baker, Jr. (Tr. 290 and 301; Ex. 17-D). 
GASSER and HORNE subsequently renegotiated their terms 
after American Savings & Loan committed a loan which might be resold 
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on a 90% participation to Equitable Savings & Loan in Portland, 
Oregon. In substance, HORNE agreed to permit the GASSERS to have 
the mortgage and the Hillgate Terrace if the loan could be sold 
to Equitable with only the GASSERS signing on the loan. Otherwise, 
HORNE demanded his 50% of Hillgate Terrace. HORNE would not be 
obligated to pay any other consideration for that 50% interest. 
During the final week of concluding the American Savings 
& Loan deal beginning June 25, 1973, the GASSERS objected to signing 
the HORNE Agreement which had been redrafted in several forms by 
Mr. Henriod (Exs. 5-P, 6-P and 22-D) because they did not like 
the limitations which required selling the loan to Equitable within 
30 days as the only condition which would render HORNE!s signature 
unnecessary. Mr. Henriod advised the GASSERS that if they did not 
sign the agreement, he would complete his foreclosure for the 
Skankey group. (Tr. 336). The GASSERS felt they would "lose 
everything" by such action, (Tr. 174) and finally, even against the 
advice of their own counsel (Tr. 226),they executed the HORNE 
agreement. That agreement is the principal issue in this appeal, 
together with the circumstances inducing execution of the same. 
On or about June 29, 197 3, the loan with American Savings 
was closed with a special escrow set up through Ralph Marsh, Esq. 
of Backman, Backman & Clark. Out of the proceeds of the loan as 
actually closed, the Skankey Group was paid approximately $401,000.00 
(Ex. 7-P). In a simultaneous transaction, the Montana properties 
were sold and Dr. Skankey and the Skankey Group paid all monies 
due (Ex. 8-P). Two sets of documents were signed, one consisting of 
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a note and trust deed with related document$ signed only by the 
GASSERS, the other having a note and trust deed signed by both 
the GASSERS and the HORNES. (Tr. 205). The trust deed signed by the 
GASSERS was actually recorded on July 2, 1973 and the documents 
signed by the HORNES are still in escrow. Thus, under the operative 
documents, the HORNES never did assume liability on any note or 
mortgage. Equitable declined to purchase the loan after it was 
closed by American Savings, but as of January 22, 1974, the loan 
was sold on a 75% participation basis to Fair West Savings & Loan, 
Portland, Oregon. American Savings had earlier indicated a willing-
ness to grant the GASSERS a loan without the HORNES, at a higher 
interest rate (Tr. 124,239), but "backed do^n" from that offer 
prior to June 29, 1973 when Mr. Henriod and Mr. HORNE made known 
their demands for the 50% interest for HORNE and made it appear 
"too messy" for American Savings to deal further with GASSERS on 
another basis. (Tr. 242). 
By reason of the duress felt by the GASSERS as well as 
the apparent lack of consideration in the HORNE Agreement, Mr. 
GASSER initiated this lawsuit to prevent the escrow agent from 
recording the deed which would have conveyed the 50% interest to 
the HORNES, and to determine.further the rights of the parties. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE HORNE AGREEMENT IS NULL AND VOID FOR LACK OF CONSIDERATION. 
The HORNE Agreement as a written document requires initial 
comment because it is manifest in the record in several different 
forms. Exhibit 4-P was the first draft, never executed, but impor-
tant as factual background in showing the state of mind of the 
parties and other circumstances while negotiating the subsequent 
versions. Exhibit 4-P did not consider the undisputed second mort-
gage to'Mr. GASSER1s father which is mentioned in handwritten inter-
lineation in two of the executed versions. It also said nothing 
about escrowing any documents, nor did it mention the proposed sale 
to Equitable Savings & Loan as later defined. The record evidences 
considerable discussion about the change in Paragraph 3 of Exhibit 
4-P by which ". . .in the event GASSER is successful in removing 
HORNE from liability . . . " was changed to use "eliminating" in-
stead of "removing". Thus the intent of the parties was evidenced 
that HORNE may never become liable for the loan. Consequently, 
it would not be necessary to "remove" a liability which did not 
exist, but rather to "eliminate" the need for HORNE to become liable. 
Exhibits 5-P and 22-D are identical except that 5-P does 
not show the signature of Mrs. GASSER. These versions, like the 
others, were prepared by Mr. Plenriod and typed in his office after 
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conference with Mr. HORNE and Mr, GASSER. Efxhibit 6-P, the other 
manifestation of the HORNE Agreement, does not refer to the $65,000 
second mortgage to Mr. GASSER1s father, but all parties admitted 
that no dispute exists with respect thereto. (Tr. 304). It appears 
that 6-P was made operative because it shows the acknowledgement of 
Ralph Marsh as escrow agent on June 29, 1973 and also evidences 
on the first page that it was document #2 on that date, presumably 
a convenient reference during the closing. But 6-P has more critical 
differences, as compared with 5-P and 22-D, which relate to the 
intent of the parties as well as execution inducement circumstances. 
In Paragraph 3 of Exhibit 6-P, the clause " . . . HORNE 
shall receive no interest in said property by reason thereof . . ." 
appears in context with the sale to Equitable. In Paragraph 4, 
concerning sale by American Savings to no party other than Equitable, 
appears the phrase ". . .to the extent GASSER is able to control 
the actions of American Savings and Loan, . . .". These changes 
were inserted at the suggestion of James L. Barker, Jr., counsel for 
the GASSERS, in his discussions with Mr. Henriod, who appeared to 
be representing HORNE. (Tr. 145-146). Althpugh Mr. Barker advised 
the GASSERS against signing the agreement (Tr. 226), he recognized 
the pressures they were -under and thus atteitipted to gain some relief 
by not tying the GASSERS to actions of American in marketing the 
loan elsewhere, over which they may have no control. His changes 
also emphasize the intent that the HORNES would have no interest 
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in the property in the event a sale of the loan with the GASSERS1 
signatures alone was successful. Exhibit 6-P is the only Agreement 
version showing the changes requested by Mr. Barker. 
The perspective will be broadened in a later demonstration 
that HORNE did not become liable on the note as a matter of fact 
(and law) after execution of the HORNE-GASSER Agreement 'and closing 
of the loan by GASSER. We argue here the elementary concept that 
the Agreement lacked consideration ab initio. Of striking signi-
ficance in the Agreement is the fact that HORNE makes no promise 
or covenant whatever 1 The last "Whereas" clause recites that 
HORNE is willing, under certain conditions, to provide financial 
backing for the loan. That clause does not represent a specific 
covenant, although the agreement to perform some unarticulated 
act might be inferred from the context and explained by parol 
evidence. Even that inference is questionable when it is remembered 
that HORNE joined with GASSER on an earlier application to Pruden-
tial (Ex. 14-D), but never did intend to become liable to Pruden-
tial. (Tr. 357). Perhaps he intended no liability at American Savings, 
either, but in any event, he achieved just that. Without an express 
covenant by HORNE, the consideration recited of "mutual promises and 
agreements of the Parties" must be interpreted as showing no considera 
tion. Only GASSER makes promises in the Agreement. There is no 
"mutual" promise of HORNE. In undisputed testimony, HORNE told 
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GASSER that he would not take compensation for signing a note 
and mortgage if he could get released within a reasonable time. 
(Tr. 112). With that intent, HORNE made no promise even to become 
obligated, and in fact, never did. Without mutuality of obligation, 
there is no consideration. On its very face, therefore, the Agree-
ment is unenforceable and of no effect. 
As a result of the foregoing, the lower courtfs Finding 
No. 5 (R. 228) is erroneous in finding that HORNE agreed to become 
personally liable on the $1,050,000.00 note to American Savings. 
Further, Finding No. 15 (R. 230) is erroneous in its statement that 
the Agreement was supported by fair and adequate consideration. 
This Court, on appeal, must find and conclude that the Agreement 
lacked consideration ab initio and did not subsequently develop 
any consideration which would support GASSER1s promises. The lower 
court's judgment should be reversed on that ground. 
Even if the Court construed HORNE'Is actual signature on 
the alternative note as extrinsic evidence to the Agreement supporting 
an inference that HORNE promised to become liable, then the Court 
must also consider external circumstances concerning whether HORNE 
actually became liable. In the first instance, a lack of promise 
created a lack of consideration. In the second instance, although 
a promise may have been inferred, there was a failure of considera-
tion when HORNE did not actually become liable on the operative 
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documents. The lower court's willingness to give effect to a con-
tract which either lacked or failed for consideration, or both, 
cannot be upheld. 
The Court will observe from the record that the note and 
Trust Deed from the GASSERS (without the HORNES1 signatures) was 
actually sold to Far West Savings & Loan under a participation by 
which American retained 25% and the servicing.(Ex. 1-P, Tr. 246, 
251). After the closing through escrow on June 29, 1973, that 
Trust Deed was recorded on July 2, 1973. The participation agree-
ment between American and Far West (part of Ex. 1-P) clearly evidences 
in Paragraph VI that no loan could be sold which was in default. 
American represented that the payments were current, but such 
could not be so without payments from the borrower. The record 
is clear, however, that HORNE was never asked to pay and never did 
pay any portion of the payments, even as of the date of trial 18 
months after the sale to Far West. Also, the participation certi-
ficate clearly indicates that JOSEPH S. GASSER, JR. was the principal 
debtor, and no mention is made of HORNE. At no time did HORNE 
attempt to assert that he was liable with GASSER on the note, for 
the record is devoid of any suggestion that he contacted American 
Savings or Far West after the loan was closed and sold/ to assert 
his interest in the property and his liability on the note. By 
his own admission, HORNE never was billed for any payment. (Tr. 
361). GASSER received all the coupon books and arranged to make 
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the payments. (Tr. 74). Consequently, HORNE did not consider 
himself liable on the note and, in fact, he did not become liable 
in law. Without such liability on HORNEfs part, there was abso-
lutely no consideration for the agreement of the GASSERS to convey 
the 50% interest. HORNE is attempting to obtain an interest for 
which he does not pay. 
Although some confusion existed during the trial regarding 
admission of testimonial evidence concerning sale of the GASSER 
loan to Far West, it is clear from the testimony of Mr. Bradshaw, 
President of American Savings, that the GASSER note and trust deed 
(shown with loan statement signed by the GASSERS only as part of 
Exhibit 7-P) were sold to Far West without documents signed by 
the HORNES. (Tr. 246). In addition, Exhibit 1-P evidences that 
the GASSER note (without the HORNES) was sold to Far West, and 
Mr. Nielsen, counsel for HORNE at trial, stipulated that Exhibit 
1-P could be admitted as evidence for the facts therein stated. 
(Tr. 6) . 
The applicable law, viewed against the facts argued above, 
supports Appellants1 conclusions. It is well established that con-
sideration is an essential element of any valid contract and that 
a promise which is not supported by consideration is not enforce-
able. See Temmen v. Kent-Brown Chevrolet Co., 535 P.2d 880 (Kan. 
1975); Malcoff v. Coyier, 484 P.2d 1053 (Ariz. 1971); Powers Res-
taurant, Inc. v. Garrison, 465 P.2d 761 (Okjla. 1970); McGrath v. 
Electrical Const. Co., 364 P.2d 604, rehearing denied, 370 P.2d 
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231 (Ore. 1969); White v. Saby, 260 P.2d 1116 (Mont. 1964). More-
over, although the general rule is that almost any benefit to a 
promisor or detriment to a promisee, however slight, can consti-
tute consideration, there must be some benefit, profit, or advan-
tage to the promisor or some loss, detriment or inconvenience to 
the promisee. See Swindel v. Kelly, 499 P.2d 291 (Alaska 1972); 
Kadish v. Kallof, 414 P.2d 193 (Ariz. 1966); Blonder v. Gentile, 
309 P.2d 147 (Calif. 1966). 
A recent Utah case, Manwill v. Oyler, 361 P.2d 177, 11 
Utah 2d 433 (1961) adopts the general position followed by other 
courts. The Manwill case involved an action on an alleged agree-
ment to repay to the Plaintiff the amount of payments he had made 
on the Defendant's behalf. The court held that in order for a 
contract to be binding, each party must be bound to give legal 
consideration to the other by benefitting him or suffering a legal 
detriment at his request. Mere moral obligation is not a valid 
consideration. In the case at bar, HORNE did not suffer a legal 
detriment and GASSER did not gain a legal benefit, either in the 
language of the Agreement as written or in the actual implementa-
tion of the loan from American Savings which was contemplated by 
the Agreement. HORNE did not promise to pay, give up or otherwise 
suffer anything under the terms of the Agreement. When the loan 
was finally made and also when it was sold to a participating 
institution, only the GASSERS were bound by the documents. HORNE 
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did not promise to become and did not actually become liable on 
the note. GASSER would have no recourse against HORNE for payment 
by contribution. Neither American Savings nor Far West Savings 
had any legal right to impose liability on HORNE for payment. 
Indeed, they did not intend to rely on HORNE and have not actually 
done so; HORNE has not paid and has not been requested t6 pay one 
penny toward the loan. Yet he tries to rely on this lack of considera-
tion as a basis for recovering 50% of a mobile home park! 
POINT II 
THE HORNE AGREEMENT IS NULL AND VOID AS HAVING BEEN EXECUTED 
BY THE GASSERS UNDER DURESS. 
This part of Appellants1 argument is both more difficult 
to explain and more sensitive. Without intending to reflect ad-
versely on acts of opposing counsel, we are nevertheless forced 
to include a description of the performance of Mr. Henriod as part 
of the circumstances constituting duress. Ordinarily, neither the 
court nor opposing counsel would have any right to tell another 
attorney whom he must represent. Yet it is part of Appellants' 
claim here that Mr. Henriod either represented the HORNES as their 
counsel in the GASSER transactions, or acted in such manner as to 
lead the GASSERS and their counsel, Mr. Barker, to believe such 
representation existed. By objective evidence later detailed, 
the record supports the proposition that both HORNE and Mr. Henriod 
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led the GASSERS to believe Mr, Henriod had authority to bind the 
HORNES. Under the evidence, the HORNES must be so bound by acts 
of Mr. Henriod. 
The duress which should invalidate the HORNE Agreement 
is briefly summarized as follows: 
1. Mr. Henriod, acting on behalf of the HORNES, threat-
ened the GASSERS that if they did not sign the HORNE Agreement, 
the Skankey foreclosure on property of the GASSERS would be com-
pleted; 
2. Mr. Henriod and HORNE threatened American Savings & 
Loan that they must go through with the GASSER-HORNE loan or suffer 
litigation at a time when American may have granted a loan with 
higher interest rate to the GASSERS alone without the HORNES and without 
a pre-committed sale; and 
3. Mr. Henriod had an unconscionable conflict of interest 
in representing the Skankey Group and HORNE through at least part 
of the GASSER transactions. 
The detailed factual and legal arguments to follow will 
amplify Appellants1 contentions that the facts in the record sup-
port Appellants'positions as summarized above and do not support 
the lower court!s Findings No. 12 (claiming that Mr. Henriod did 
not represent HORNE), No. 14 (claiming that Plaintiffs were not 
induced, coerced or intimidated) and No. 15 (claiming that Defend-
ants were not guilty of other wrongful or improper conduct). (R.229). 
-15-
Subject to later discussions of certain legal and evi-
dentiary points, the detailed evidence concerning duress on the 
GASSERS is demonstrated by the following recapitulation: 
1. The so-called Skankey Group was represented by Mr. 
Henriod (Tr. 290), but Dr. Skankey personally was represented also 
by Richard Harris, Esq. (in Mr. Marsh's escrow office in, the meeting 
of June 20, 1973 (Tr. 76), and according to Mr. Henriod's testimony. 
(Tr. 345). 
2. Early in the HORNE-GASSER negotiations, Mr. HORNE 
told Mr. GASSER, in undisputed testimony, that Mr. Henriod was his 
attorney. (Tr. 78). Thereafter, Mr. Henriod admittedly prepared 
the draft agreement, Exhibit 4-P (Tr. 292) and commenced discussions 
with HORNE and GASSER resulting in 5-P, 6-Pjand 22-D (Tr. 86). 
Although GASSER and HORNE commenced initial discussions without 
the assistance of Mr. Barker for GASSER and Mr. Henriod for HORNE, 
it was only natural that the definitive agreements would be prepared 
and reviewed by the respective counsel. HORNE turned to Mr. Henriod 
for this purpose because Mr. Henriod had represented him on prior 
matters (Tr. 319) and obviously commenced representing him in con-
nection with this lawsuit after it was filed (Tr. 331). 
3. During a meeting at Mr. Henriod's office attended 
by HORNE and GASSER on June 27, 1973, HORNE demanded his 50% interest 
in Hillgate Terrace under circumstances which caused GASSER to 
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walk out of the meeting rather than state what he really felt. (Tr. 
84). Later, Mr. Henriod told GASSER that he should work things out 
with HORNE. (Tr. 86). Exhibits 5-P, 6-P and 22-D followed those 
discussions. 
4. Even though Mr. Barker's position as counsel for 
GASSER was known, Mr. Barker permitted GASSER to speak directly 
to Mr. Henriod on most occasions without Mr. Barker's intercession 
as counsel. (Tr. 103). 
5. The squeeze-play on the GASSERS between Mr. Henriod's 
Skankey clients and his HORNE clients began gradually and is demon-
strated most aptly by Exhibit 17-D. On May 7, 1973, Mr. Henriod 
wrote Mr. Barker a letter concerning the HORNE-GASSER Agreement 
(presumably the draft, Exhibit 4-P) and complained of lack of 
communication in working out details before closing the loan. 
Mr. Henriod therein stated, "We need to prepare escrow instructions 
which are going to meet your approval and your clients approval 
and also mine and my clients approval. We also need these agree-
ments circulated to obtain my client's approval." Notwithstanding 
inconsistent use of apostrophes on the word "client", the last 
use as "client's" suggests that he is talking about HORNE rather 
than the Skankey Group. Furthermore, Exhibit 18-D, the Skankey 
settlement agreement, had been executed some time earlier, and 
it was not necessary for Mr. Barker to review that again. The 
inescapable conclusion is that Mr. Henriod, on behalf of his client, 
HORNE, was seeking some responses from Mr. Barker relative to the 
HORNE-GASSER Agreement. 
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6. Although Mr. Henriod continued to put pressure on 
GASSER to pay Skankey and the Skankey Group after November 1972 
(Tr. 112-113), yet the communications between GASSER and Mr. Henriod 
were somewhat tension-free until June 11, 1973. On that date, Mr. 
Henriod summoned GASSER to his office and delivered a letter of 
demand (Ex. 16-D) by which the obligations to the Skankey Group 
had to be paid by June 25, 1973. (Tr. 121). This demand accelerated 
the squeeze-play. 
7. During a conversation between Mr. Barker and Mr. 
Henriod after submission of Mr. Henriod1s draft resulting in Exhibit 
5-P, on or after June 25, 1973, Mr. Barker told Mr. Henriod that 
the agreements were unfair and did not represent what HORNE had 
earlier agreed to. Mr. Henriod responded that his client (HORNE) 
had changed his mind. This testimony remains undisputed in the 
record. These events also form part of the entire context wherein 
Mr. Henriod was acting solely for Mr. HORNE's interests in conversa-
tions with GASSER and Mr. Barker, in matters which were of no 
direct concern to his Skankey clients. Mr. Henriod would not have 
reason to discuss HORNE's matters with Mr. Barker if he were not 
purporting to represent HORNE. 
8. When the closing was imminent and the HORNE Agreement 
had not yet been finalized as of June 26, 1973, Mr. Henriod contacted 
HORNE in San Francisco and arranged for the HORNES and the GASSERS 
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to meet the next day to complete the Agreements. (Tr. 301). HORNE 
confirmed Mr. Henriodfs testimony in that regard in language which cer 
tainly sounds as if an attorney and his client are conversing: 
"Q (By Mr. Halgren) Mr. Home, when you were contacted 
by Mr. Henriod sometime on the 26th day of June 
1973 by telephone do you recall anything that was 
discussed between you and Mr. Henriod at that time? 
A Yes. 
Q Would you tell me wnar was said? 
A Mr. Henriod asked me if I was ready to sign the agree-
ment that had been prepared sometime earlier. 
Q And what did you tell him? 
A I told him that it was an entirely different time, 
that I didn't know if I was prepared to sign it or 
not; that I would be back in Salt Lake the next day 
and we would discuss it." (Tr. 359). 
9. In conversation between Mr. Marsh, escrow agent,and Mr. 
Henriod during the week of June 25th, Mr. Henriod stated that GASSER 
had accused him of a conflict of interest in representing both the 
Skankeys and the HORNES. Mr. Henriodfs comment was: "I guess I do 
have a conflict but we will have to let the chips fall where they 
may with respect to that." (Tr. 203-204). (See later discussion 
re: proffer of proof in connection with this testimony). Mr. Henriod 
did not deny making that statement to Mr. Marsh, although he conveni-
ently couldn't "recall" such statement. (Tr. 352). In testimony 
of GASSER which appears embarassing at first glance, but in substance 
does not impair his evidence or his legal position, GASSER asked 
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HORNE not to tell Mr. Henriod of the value of the mobile home park 
as demonstrated by an appraisal of Mr. Kiepe (Tr. 115). GASSER 
felt keenly the conflict which Mr. Henriod didn't want to face (or 
escape) and believed that the value of the park necessary for the 
loan (and to satisfy HORNE if he should join the loan) was so high 
that the Skankey agreement might be upset if Mr. Henriod'realized 
the full value. HORNE, for selfish interests, was willing to with-
hold that information from his own attorney. 
10. The squeeze-play on the GASSERS became downright 
difficult when the threats from Mr. Henriod were intensified. When 
GASSER asked for another weekend after June 29, 1973 to think about 
HORNEfs demands for 50% and the imminent closing of the loan, Mr. 
Henriod told him, "No, you have no more time, if you don't sign 
today my clients will foreclose and there will be nothing left of 
the situation." (Tr. 88 and 147). Mrs. GASSER, recalling similar 
threats from Mr. Henriod, characterized them as leading her to 
believe that they would "lose everything" by Mr. Henriod's fore-
closure. (Tr. 174). She specified that although Mr. Henriod was 
making the threats, they were really for HORNEfs benefit. (Tr. 187). 
Although Mr. Henriod denied threatening that the GASSERS 
"would lose everything" (Tr. 306), which was probably the GASSERS' 
characterization of the import of his threats, Mr. Henriod clearly 
stated his threats in response to questions by Mr. Halgren: 
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"Q What I'm talking about, the critical time now when 
he has either got to fish or cut bait, he either 
has to get this loan finalized or he loses the 
whole thing. 
A I think in the 28th — on the 28th, I think I said 
'If you don't come up with the money by the 28th or 
29th, now, that it will be necessary for me to fore-
close. ' I had already given the written notice to 
that effect on the 11th. 
* * * 
Q Well, you were threatening to foreclose. 
A Yes, I was threatening to foreclose but that was 
only part of his assets." (Tr. 336-337). 
The nature of the foreclosure is also clarified by Mr. 
Henriod, with emphasis showing that his threats were not mere idle 
talk: 
"Q (By Mr. Nielsen) Will you state when and what 
was done? 
A About March of 197 3 we commenced an action against 
Mr. Gasser and in the State of Montana to foreclose 
the interest that had been assigned to secure the 
payment of the $225,000. Also prepared pleadings 
which were not filed to foreclose the interest in 
the Layton trailer park." (Tr. 337). 
It is evident that Mr. Henriod meant business. And he 
was thus in a strong position to tell the GASSERS that they must 
go along with the HORNE demands or his already-commenced foreclosure 
in Montana would be completed and his about-to-be-commenced fore-
closure in Utah would be implemented. 
11. It is incongruent for Mr. Henriod to be involved 
in the squeeze-play on the GASSERS as he otherwise admitted that he 
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didn't really care where the money for the Skankey Group came from. 
In the same regard, he Was not sufficiently concerned about the 
appraisal on the park to ask Home for a copy of the appraisal. 
(Tr. 317). His reasons: 
"Q Did you have any particular reason why you were 
not concerned with the appraised value of this 
property? 
A My concern was getting the $468 or $470,000, plus 
the $225 for my clients, wherever Mr. Gasser got 
his money was of no concern to me except that he 
got it and paid it." (Tr. 318). 
12. The threats constituting duress on the GASSERS as-
sumed a- different but sharper focus when both Mr. Henriod and 
HQRNE put pressures on American Savings & Loan relative to the 
GASSER matter. When GASSER was seeking to ^restructure the loan 
without any need of HORNEfs signature, he had preliminary indications 
from American Savings that an interest rate of 9% may be hard to sell 
with the GASSERS alone on the documents, but with a 10% rate (which 
GASSER agreed to pay) the loan would be more marketable. (Tr. 124). 
The question of using a higher rate loan with the GASSERS (but not 
the HORNES) is connected closely with the demands made by HORNE 
and Mr. Henriod that American Savings go along with them and not 
negotiate further with the GASSERS. The import of the evidence 
is that American Savings was willing to make a loan on an increased 
rate to the GASSERS alone without the HORNES and without a pre-
committed sale to another financial institution. No written com-
mitment to that effect was ever finalized, however, by reason of 
the pressures from HORNE and Mr. Henriod. 
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During the testimony of Mr. Bradshaw, President of American Savings 
& Loan, the following dialogue occurred: 
"Q (By Mr. Halgren) Well, was there any discussion 
relative to a change in the rate of interest 
relative to this loan? 
A There was discussion about a change in the rate 
of interest. 
Q Was the change up or down" 
— (Objection by the Court to leading question) — 
Q All right, How was the change? 
A It was to be changed upward so the loan could be sold. 
Q' And what inportance was that that the loan could 
be sold? 
A Well, there was a lot more people in the market 
when the rate is high and they overlook certain 
things when it's a profitable loan. 
Q What was Mr. Gasser's position with regards to any 
increase in the loan rate? 
A He was willing to have it increased." (Tr. 240) 
Further testimony of Mr. Bradshaw suggested the pressures his insti-
tution felt: 
"Q (By Mr. Halgren) Do you know of any thing that 
arose in the business of American Savings that 
caused American Savings and Loan not to increase 
the loan rate to ten percent? 
A Well, as previously stated it got to be a hassle 
and got to be involved with two sides, I honestly 
don't think I was ever threatened. You said threat-
ened, I don't think I was ever threatened or anything 
like that, but it got uncomfortable to the point 
where it was kind of messy. We talked it over with 
our counsel, he advised us not to raise it, not to 
be involved." (Tr. 241). 
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"Q (By Mr. Halgren) Did you have any conversation 
with either Mr. Home or Mr. Henriod relative to 
their position on an increase in the loan rate. 
A I can't remember the specific exact conversation,no, 
I can't, but I know that gist of it, that we learned 
both sides and the problems, and that's why we 
backed down. 
Q So because of that you kept Mr. Dave Home's name 
on the loan application and included him as a party 
in the transaction, is that correct? 
A I think he isn't a party to the transaction, is he?" 
(Tr. 242) . 
The first statements above evidence that American Savings 
would have gone forward with the GASSERS on a loan with increased 
rate, without the HORNES, if American Savings hadn't backed down. 
After learning the problems concerning Mr. HORNE and Mr. Henriod, 
however, American Savings backed down. Even without strong threats 
from them, it is obvious that American Savings terminated its further 
discussions with the GASSERS as a result of the HORNE-Henriod 
pressures. The trial judge characterized these activities as 
"Interfering with a contractual relationship" (Tr. 238) and decided 
that such activities may give rise to a tort| liability but should 
not be used to declare the agreement null and void. Appellants 
here urge that such "interference" is part of the duress on the 
GASSERS which should properly be used as a basis for invalidating 
the HORNE Agreement. Mr. Bradshaw's last answer quoted above 
evidences that HORNE was not on the operative documents, and he 
wondered why Mr. Halgren described HORNE as a "party" to the 
transactions. 
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During an earlier dialogue as part of Mr. Bradshaw's 
testimony, the court erroneously refused to allow Mr. Halgren 
to use Mr. Bradshaw's deposition as a means of refreshing recol-
lection and clarifying matters on which the witness was unclear 
by the time of trial. (See later discussion of the legal points 
concerning use of depositions). The depositions should have been 
used as an aid to the court in undeirstanding the full import of 
Mr. Bradshaw's testimony. The deposition testimony of Mr. Howard 
C. Bradshaw, under date of October 9, 1973, clearly spells out 
both the interest rate consideration and the pressures from HORNE 
or Mr. Henriod, under the interrogation by HORNE's counsel, Mr. 
Cook, then affiliated with Mr. Henriod's office: 
"Q (By Mr. Cook) Would you state in a general way 
what the loan market was doing between February of 
'73 and July of '73 with respect to loans of this 
nature regarding interest rates and salability of 
loans of this size? Did that trigger the right 
things? 
A The loans, of course, were increasing, drastically 
increasing. 
Q Interest rates? 
A Interest rates. And the loan became unsalable and 
we asked Mr. Gasser if he would increase the loan 
so it could be sold. And this benefits me and it 
evidently benefited him, too, that he didn't have 
to—he thought maybe he wouldn't have to work with 
Mr. Home so he was immediately agreeable so that 
I could get it up to a rate where I could sell it 
and he could live without Dave Home. 
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Q Now, let's see, the original rate was nine percent 
as of February 21, 1973, and so to put this thing 
in a time frame, at what point were you having con-
versations with Mr. Gasser about increasing that 
to ten? 
A I'm not sure of the dates. I'm sure a month or 
two after that date. 
Q March, April? 
A Yes, I think so. 
Q And you say he was agreeable to raising the rate 
of interest? 
A Yes. He was agreeable. 
Q Then was something done to raise the rate of in-
terest or to attempt to get a commitment to purchase 
that? 
A Yes. The market at that time it could have been 
sold at the ten percent, but we didn't want to get 
in this big dog fight so we backed off. I don't 
know how we could change it. 
Q Backed off from selling it? 
A No. Backed off—I haven't anything to sell until 
I can get a new note and mortgage signed up, you 
see, and I'd have to negotiate a new note and mort-
gage. At this time this thing kind of exploded or 
we could see it building up so our attorney, Ed 
Clyde, said, 'Let's not mess with it.' 
Q In terms of — 
A Changing the rate. Do you understand that? 
Q No. 
A Okav. Well— 
Q You were saying to Gasser: 'Would you agree to a 
higher rate of interest,' and he was saying, 'Yes'? 
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A I will. And if there had been—if that's all there 
were to it, I'm sure this loan today would have 
been sold, the new note would have been made at ten 
percent and recorded, and so on and so forth, and 
the loan could have been sold and been done with. 
But in the meantime, Dave Home called up or Joe 
Henriod or somebody and said,'Look, we're in the 
middle of this thing. We have rights, and you better 
not do this.' And I reported this to our attorney 
on the board of directors and he said, 'Forget it, 
don't mess with it,it's too messy.1 
Q You mean rights in the loan commitment at the lesser 
rate or whatever? 
A Yes. He said leave it alone. Let's let them fight 
it out and we'll go from there." (pp. 22-24). 
13. Exhibit 8-P is a set of escrow instructions prepared 
by Mr. Henriod in connection with the loan closing at American 
Savings. Most of that document consists of instructions concerning 
handling of funds and instruments relating to Dr. Skankey and the 
Skankey Group, and Mr. Henriod expressly states therein that he is 
attorney for them. However, Mr. Henriod also provided instructions 
for the benefit of the HORNES as if he were also acting on their 
behalf. Paragraph III details handling of documents for the HORNES 
and relating to their interests. The Addendum to Escrow Instructions, 
part of Exhibit 8-P, slightly revises the instructions for the 
benefit of the HORNES by advising the escrow agent: 
" . . . you are further instructed to hold the 
Deed from Gasser and Freda to David M. Home and Jeanne 
M. Home and to record said Deed only in the event 
American Savings & Loan Association requests you to do 
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Such instructions relate only to the interests of the HORNES and 
were not a necessary part of the Skankey Group instructions. Ap-
pellants strongly assert that Mr. Henriod was knowingly acting as 
counsel for the HORNES in preparation of escrow documents for the 
loan closing and that his position as counsel for them and as 
counsel for the Skankey Group and Dr. Skankey provided an opportunity 
to make demands on the GASSERS which constituted duress. 
When the foregoing facts are viewed against the law per-
taining to business duress, the Court must concur with Appellants1 
positions herein stated. This Court has clearly stated the law 
regarding business or economic duress in prior decisions. In Fox 
v, Piercey, 119 Utah 367, 227 P.2d 763 (1951), the court reversed 
the lower court's findings of duress and determined that no duress 
existed in that particular case. However, after an historical 
review of the developments of the law pertaining to duress, the 
governing propositions of law were announced: 
"To summarize, then, there have been four distinct 
phases in the development of the law regarding duress: 
1. The ancient rule limiting it to certain speci-
fied acts; i 
2. The enlargement to include any threats, but 
requiring the 'brave man' test; 
3. The relaxing of this rule to apply the 'man 
of ordinary firmness1 test; and 
4. The modern rule that any wrongful act or threat 
which actually puts the victim in such fear as 
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to compel him to act against his will con-
stitutes duress. 
We approve this modern rule."•*•* * (227 P.2d at 766). 
The court in Fox thereafter discussed the difficulties 
of subjective tests for determining duress and the desirability 
that an objective standard be used. Describing the rule of law 
as "modern and liberal", the court nevertheless stated that the act 
or threat constituting duress must be wrongful, and approvingly 
quoted the Restatement of the Law of Contracts: 
"Acts or threats cannot constitute duress unless 
they are wrongful, even though they exert such pressure 
as' to preclude the exercise of free judgment. But acts 
may be wrongful within the meaning of this rule though 
they are not criminal or tortious or in violation of 
a contractual duty * * * * 227 P.2d at 766. [Emphasis 
added]. 
The applicable law was further discussed by the Utah 
Supreme Court in Reliable Fruniture Company v. Fidelity & Guaranty 
Insurance Underwriters, Inc./ 16 Utah 2d 211, 398 P.2d 685 (1965). 
In a suit against an insurance company for losses covered by a busi-
ness interruption policy, plaintiff claimed fraud and duress because 
settlement of one claim could not be effected without the insured's 
agreeing to settlement of a claim under another policy for an 
objectionably low amount. This court reversed and remanded for 
trial the lower courtfs summary judgment for the insurer. The 
court stated: 
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"In determining whether the plaintiff is entitled 
to redress, it is not essential that his contentions 
of fraud and duress be considered separately. They can 
and should be considered on the basis that he contends 
they existed, intermingled together. *** If we accept 
the facts as plaintiff contends them to be, as we are 
obliged to do on this review, we must assume not only 
that the plaintiff was in economic distress, but that 
defendant knew this and took advantage of him by falsely 
representing that money belonging to the plaintiff could 
not be delivered to him, and wrongfully refusing to de-
liver it unelss plaintiff would also accept the prof-
fered settlement on defendant's policy, which resulted 
in compelling plaintiff to accept the latter settlement 
against his will . . . . " 398 P.2d at 687. 
The foregoing statement from the court gives rise to 
some compelling inferences regarding the facts of the case at Bar. 
The Reliable case was reviewed again after trial and re-
ported at 24 Utah 2d 93, 466 P.2d 368 (1970). There the court af-
firmed the judgment favoring defendant. The facts did not support 
the claimed duress because plaintiff obtained one check and cashed 
it and had nine days with the other (disputed) check before cashing 
it, thus leading the court to conclude that whatever coercion may 
have existed to compel acceptance of the offer ceased to exist 
before cashing the second check. But the principles of law regarding 
duress were not changed by the court. Appellants here submit that 
the duress from Mr. Henriod on behalf of HORNE continued right down 
to the closing of the American Savings transaction late on June 29, 
1973. 
Other courts have found duress, as a matter of fact, and 
have applied similar principles of law with additional nuances of 
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analysis. In Terrel v. Duke City Lumber Company, Inc., 86 N.M. 
405, 524 P.2d 1021 (1974), the court used the terminology "economic 
compulsion" rather than "duress" and dealt with the subject under 
classical tort theory. The facts are lengthy and difficult to review, 
but the court's decision has merit in its legal reasoning and the 
fact that duress was found to exist sufficient to affirm a judgment 
for damages. Using the normal elements of a tort, including a 
duty of care, a breach of that duty, causation and damages, we trans-
late that court's reasoning into the facts at Bar as follows: 
(1) Duty of Care: Mr. Henriod and HORNE had the superior 
bargaining position as the sole effective source of something needed 
by the GASSERS (the loan) to avoid a severe economic loss. Thus, 
they had the duty to use that position reasonably to assure the 
weaker parties (the GASSERS) a reasonable choice of alternatives. 
(2) Breach of Duty: The straightforward threat to fore-
close on all of the GASSERS1 property if they did not sign the 
HORNE Agreement represented an unreasonable use of a superior 
bargaining position, especially where GASSER might have obtained 
a loan at higher rate without the HORNES and where ultimately the 
subject loan was closed at American Savings, who sold it to another 
investor, without a higher rate and without the necessity of the 
HORNES1 signatures. 
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(3) Causation: The direct and proximate cause of the 
GASSERS1 execution of the HORNE Agreement ar^ d closing the subject 
j 
loan with an alternative set of documents was the threats of HORNE 
and Mr. Henriod regarding foreclosure. As the GASSERS told Mr. 
Marsh, they were "forced" to go through with the loan and the 
HORNE Agreement. (Tr. 214). 
(4) Damages: Although money damages are not sought by 
the GASSERS here, suffering the loss to the HORNES of 50% of a 
mobile home park worth $1,688,000.00 (Ex. 21-P), and subject to 
mortgages of about $1,200,000.00 in the aggregate, without receiv-
ing compensation therefor, constitutes serious economic deprivation 
to the GASSERS. 
The Terrel case analysis is not dissimilar to the Utah 
Court's reasoning in Fox and Reliable, supra. The objective stand-
ards by which this court judges wrongful conduct, i.e., conduct of 
such nature and under such circumstances as to control the will, 
achieves the same result as describing the wrongful conduct in terms 
of duty, breach and causation. Whichever words are used to describe 
the wrong, HORNE's actions, through Mr. Henziod , constitute inter-
ference with the free right to seal a new contract with American 
Savings. As the lower court suggested (Tr. 239) the "contractual 
interference" must be viewed as a breach of duty resulting in a 
void agreement between the HORNES and the GASSERS. 
A different semantic gloss on the same theme is seen 
in Dittbrenner v. Myerson 167 P.2d 15 (Colo. 1946). There duress 
sufficient to invalidate a contract was fouhd, and the court reversed 
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and remanded a judgment for defendant in a case whereby plaintiff 
alleged duress in sale of real estate through defendant. The court 
stated, inter alia: "Under the circumstances of the parties here, 
as established without contradiction, actual misrepresentations 
were not necessary in order to establish constructive fraud." 
(167 P.2d at 20). The inequality in the Dittbrenner case was one 
of experience differential between the parties. The inequality 
in this case is one of financial, or control of the means of ob-
taining financial relief. While Appellants here have never claimed 
actual and deliberate misrepresentations by HORNE or Mr. Henriod, 
under the rule of Dittbrenner, wrongful conduct can be inferred 
if the result of threats is duress leading to involuntary actions. 
It is important to observe that the means of economic 
duress suffered by the GASSERS here was not just a statement of 
the rights of Mr. Henriod!s other clients to resort to judicial 
means of collecting matured debts. This is not merely "If you 
don't pay, I111 foreclose". Such threat to collect by lawful means 
a just debt due would not constitute actionable duress. The case 
involves facts far beyond such ordinary conduct. Here we witness 
an attorney who "held all the aces". He represented Dr. Skankey 
and the Skankey Group. If he did not represent HORNE (and we 
submit he did), he placed himself in a position to influence HORNE 
and control events bearing on HORNEfs interests (Ex. 8-P, for 
example). Thus, by demanding rightful relief for one group through 
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a wrongful demand that the GASSERS sign the HORNE Agreement, he 
utilized unfairly a superior bargaining position as the HORNES' 
de facto representative, to coerce the GASSERS1 conduct for the 
HORNES1 benefit. Moreover, the wrongful conduct, if this court 
were to condone it, would result in a $300,000.00 windfall to the 
HORNES for which they neither paid consideration nor suffered 
any detriment. The flagrant unfairness of the proposition is 
revolting to our sense of justice. 
Accordingly, it is submitted that Appellants have demon-
strated the legal and factual grounds on which the court should, 
and must, reverse the judgment. 
Having discussed the operative fafcts and the governing 
law concerning duress, Appellants now provide a brief discussion 
concerning certain evidentiary points mentioned earlier. The first 
concerns the use of the deposition of Mr. Bradshaw, which was pub-
lished without objection during trial. (Tr. 232). When Mr. Brad-
shaw did not respond to Mr. Halgren's questions at trial with the 
same clarity as shown by his deposition, counsel attempted to permit 
Mr. Bradshaw to refresh his recollection from page 23 of his Octo-
ber 1973 deposition. In response to objections, the court held 
that it was not proper to hand the deposition to the witness and 
let him read it. After counsel attempted to read parts of the 
deposition into the record, the court sustained an objection to 
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that procedure. In such rulings, the court erred. The deposition 
should have been used either to refresh the recollection of the 
witness or, if the memory remained unrefreshed, to constitute 
substantive evidence. Rule 63(1) of the Utah Rules of Evidence 
provides: 
"Evidence of a statement which is made other than by 
a witness while testifying at the hearing offered to 
prove the truth of the matter stated is hearsay evidence 
and inadmissible except: 
(1) a prior statement of a witness, if the judge finds 
that the witness had an adequate opportunity to perceive 
the event or condition which his statement narrates, 
describes or explains, provided that (a) it is incon-
sistent with his present testimony, or (b) it contains 
otherwise admissible facts which the witness denies having 
stated or has forgotten since making the statement, or 
(c) it will support testimony made by the witness in 
the present case when such testimony has been challenged;" 
[Emphasis added]. 
The testimony proffered by Mr. Bradshaw's deposition, 
quoted at length in the factual discussion paragraph numbered 12 
above, was essential as part of the evidence demonstrating the wrong-
ful conduct of Mr. Henriod for his client HORNE under the rules 
announced in Fox v. Piercey, supra. Such relevant and admissible 
evidence should not have been excluded by the trial judge and is 
susceptible of consideration by this court on appeal. Rule 63(3) 
of the Utah Rules of Evidence expressly allows the use of depositions 
as an exception to the hearsay rule under certain conditions, 
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including the circumstances where the adverse party was present 
and cross-examined in the prior deposition testimony. 
Further confirming Appellants1 position is Rule 5 of the 
Utah Rules of Evidence, which expressly permits the setting aside 
of a verdict or finding when the excluded evidence would probably 
have had a substantial influence in bringing about a different 
verdict or finding. Mr. Bradshaw's testimony about pressure from 
HORNE and/or Mr. Henriod and the resulting "backing down" of American 
Savings from other negotiations with the GASSERS unequivocally 
supports the wrongfulness of Respondents1 actions and the conse-
quent necessity to reverse the lower court's findings and judgment. 
Another evidentiary matter having great significance and 
adding to the grounds for believing the judgment would be altered 
but for evidence wrongfully excluded is the proffer of proof through 
Mr. Ralph Marsh. When Mr. Halgren asked Mr. Marsh about a conversa-
tion he had with Mr. Henriod, the court sustained an objection on 
the basis that it was hearsay as to HORNE. (Tr. 203). In a proffer 
of proof, Mr. Halgren elicited from Mr. Marsh testimony concerning 
the conflict of interest to which Mr. Henriod admitted. (Tr. 203-
204). When Mr. Halgren asked for a ruling on his proffer, the 
court replied, "You may proceed back on regular". (Tr. 204). This 
statement of the court leaves unclear whether the proffered testi-
mony was admitted or stricken. If the testimony was admitted, 
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then it stands as substantive evidence against the Respondents and 
their counsel. If stricken, such was wrongful, for the testimony 
is clearly admissible under Rule 5 and Rule 63(1) of the Rules of 
Evidence, quoted above. In that event, Mr. Marsh's hearsay testi-
mony at trial relates to the prior statements of Mr. Henriod as 
a witness, which are admissible as inconsistent with his testimony 
at trial. 
POINT III 
AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO OUTRIGHT REVERSAL OF THE JUDGMENT, 
APPELLANTS SEEK REMAND FOR A TRIAL BY JURY WHICH WAS 
WRONGFULLY DENIED. 
During pendency of the case below, counsel for Defendants 
requested a non-jury trial as of February 22, 1974. (R. 132). The 
case was set for trial October 11, 1974 and continued to October 15, 
1974 (R. 156). Prior to the trial setting, Mr. Halgren, then 
counsel for Plaintiffs, paid the $15.00 jury fee on September 23, 
1974. The case was then continued again to February 5, 1975. 
(R. 155). Although the notices of continuance do not clearly 
state, the circumstances clearly indicate that the parties expected 
a jury trial. On February 3, 1975, counsel for Defendants filed 
a motion to strike the case from the jury calendar (R. 214). That 
motion was granted by order of February 10, 1975 (R. 220) without 
designation of reasons for such order. The case was continued 
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from February 5, 1975 to February 24, 1975 (R. 219) and again 
to June 25, 1975 (R. 222). Trial commenced before Judge Baldwin 
June 26, 1975. (R. 261). 
The possible grounds for denial of the jury trial, based 
on the motion to strike, are discussed as follows: 
1. "No demand for a jury has been made as required by 
Rule 15 of the Rules of Practice for the Third Judicial District 
Court." This ground was not well taken. Rule 15 provides for 
jury trial upon filing of a written demand and the payment of the 
required statutory fee, and the demand and fee must be filed at 
least ten (10) days prior to trial. Payment of the jury fee on 
September 23, 1974 with trial set for October 11, 1974, and know-
ledge by Defendants1 counsel, constitutes sufficient compliance 
with that rule. The case was actually set by the clerk on the jury 
calendar prior to the motion of Defendants, and it is obvious that 
Defendants1 counsel had notice of payment of the jury fee, as a 
result of which the court is entitled to assume that a demand 
was made (but not in the record) or that counsel was nevertheless 
given notice which would be a substitute for the written demand. 
2. "Failure of the Plaintiffs to comply with the provi-
sions of Rule 38(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure." That Rule 
preserves the right of trial by jury as declared by the Constitu-
tion or as given by statute, and permits a party to demand a trial 
by jury by paying the statutory fee and serving upon the other 
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parties a demand therefor in writing. The rule was complied with 
in the same manner as Rule 15 of the Third District Court, discussed 
above. 
3. "Plaintiffs are not entitled to a jury trial under 
the constitution and the statutes of the State of Utah, particularly 
Article 8, Section 9, Constitution of the State of Utah, and Section 
78-21-1, UCA, 1953, as amended." The statutory provision cited 
preserves the right to trial by jury, "in actions for the recovery 
of specific real or personal property, with or without damages..." 
(Sec. 78-21-1). Where the GASSERS seek to recover from the HORNES 
the 50% interest in Hillgate Terrace claimed by the HORNES and 
embodied in an unrecorded deed, such action lis for the recovery 
of specific real property as contemplated by that statute. Thus, 
the GASSERS were entitled to a trial by jury. 
The constitutional provision cited does not impair the 
right to jury trial. Article 8(VIII), Section 9 actually deals 
with appeals, and deals with cases in equity or at law. It seems 
to be the position of Defendants that the complaint seeks equitable, 
not legal relief, and thus a trial by jury is improper. Yet it is 
painfully evident from the matters heretofore argued in this brief 
that substantial questions of fact were raised by the pleadings and 
the evidence. The complaint seeks a restraining order and a decree 
adjudicating that the HORNE Agreement is null and void. (R. 2). 
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The counterclaim seeks damages plus specitic performance and re-
straining orders. (R.10) A trial concerning rights under a disputed 
agreement (lack of consideration and duress) and the counterclaim 
for damages raises factual issues within the province of a jury. 
A jury can decide issues of fact even in equity cases. And this 
court can review both fact and law in such cases. Section 78-2-2, 
UCA, 1953, as amended. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellants submit that this court should reverse the 
judgment of the lower court and order judgment for Appellants 
on the grounds: 
1. This court has the power on appeal to review the trial 
judge's findings and substitute its own, where the evidence would 
support different findings. This proposition has not been argued 
in the brief. It is so fundamental that extensive citations are 
not necessary. See Rule 7(a) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
2. The Agreement between the GASSERS and the HORNES 
(Ex. 6-P) is null and void for lack of consideration. 
3. The Agreement between the GASSERS and the HORNES 
is of no effect because execution thereof by the GASSERS was induced 
by the threats and other circumstances con^tituing business or 
economic duress. Such duress deprived the GASSERS of visible alter-
native methods of refinancing the subject mobile home park or other-
wise obtaining financial relief. As a result, execution of the 
Agreement by the GASSERS was not voluntary. 
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4. The HORNBS are not entitled to receive a 50% interest 
in the mobile home park without consideration, as a matter of law 
or equity. 
Alternatively, Appellants seek remand for jury trial 
which was erroneously denied. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
BY S£^^.^& 
Don B. Allen 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
and Appellants 
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